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University, Jinan, Shandong, ChinaA B S T R A C TObjectives: To predict the prospects of the essential drug system by
using the Stakeholder Impact Index (SII) and evaluate the current
performance of each main stakeholder and suggested dangerous
stakeholders and dormant stakeholders. Methods: A Delphi method
was used, involving 36 experts with experience in implementation and
evaluation of the essential drug policy, to construct the circular model
as well as evaluate the performance of each stakeholder. Results: The
central government was a dominant stakeholder of the whole essential
drug system. The provincial governments were deﬁnitive stakeholders,
whereas local governments and medical institutions were dependent
stakeholders. Furthermore, media and drug stores were dormant
stakeholders and pharmaceutical manufacturers and delivery enter-
prises were dangerous stakeholders. Patients, community residents,
and medical insurance programs were discretionary stakeholders. The
SII for the essential drug system was positive (SIIproj* ¼ 2.72). Con-
clusions: The overall anticipation of the essential drug policy is optimistic.ee front matter Copyright & 2015, International S
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niversity, 1440 Canal Street, New Orleans, LA 7011Letting deﬁnitive stakeholders (provincial governments) having more
autonomy can efﬁciently accelerate the pace of implementation of the
essential drug policy in the current situation. Central government, how-
ever, also needs to construct an experience exchange platform with the
aim of building versatile methods for running the essential drug system in
all provinces. Pharmaceutical manufacturers and delivery enterprises were
dangerous stakeholders for the essential drug policy. Because of their
potential threat to the implementation of the policy, the central govern-
ment should motivate them to support the construction of the essential
drug system spontaneously. In that case, provincial governments need to
construct a fair, balanced, and self-stabilized bidding platform.
Keywords: essential drug, system evaluation, stakeholder analysis,
Delphi method.
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Essential drugs, as deﬁned by the World Health Organization, are
“those drugs that satisfy the health care needs of the majority of
the population; they should therefore be available at all times in
adequate amounts and in appropriate dosage forms, at a price
the community can afford” [1]. Within the last 30 years after this
deﬁnition was put forward, many countries started to construct
their own Essential Drug Operation System (EDOS) [2].
China’s central government’s “Measurements for Implement-
ing Essential Drug Policy” and “Essential Drug List (EDL),” intro-
duced in August 18, 2009 [3], have had a profound inﬂuence on
Chinese citizens in terms of improving physical and ﬁnancial
access to basic medication. The national EDL is categorized into
three broad categories: Chemical Drugs and Biological Products,
Chinese Patent Drugs, and Chinese Medicinal Decoction Pieces.There are 317 subcategories of drugs under Chemical Drugs and
Biological Products, whereas Chinese Patent Drugs contain 207
subcategories. Every province is authorized to construct a pro-
vincial EDL that can work as a supplement to the national EDL.
Drugs are included in the EDL for the purpose of fulﬁlling citizens’
basic medical needs by providing fair and cheap medicines and
promoting universal access. The essential drug policy reduces
medication costs for citizens through more governmental ﬁnanc-
ing and introduction of a provincial drug-bidding platform. It
reshapes proﬁt distribution among all stakeholders in the EDOS
by altering the net beneﬁts among pharmaceutical manufac-
turers, delivery enterprises, and health care providers [4].
The current EDOS, including its bidding, pricing, and delivery
system, required full cooperation of stakeholders, and citizens
would gain beneﬁts only if most of the stakeholders are willing to
participate in the EDOS. For example, more pharmaceuticalociety for Pharmacoeconomics and Outcomes Research (ISPOR).
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Fig. 2 – Essential drug operation system.
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increase the drug quality and reduce its price. Therefore, if some
of the stakeholders lose beneﬁts under the implementation of the
essential drug policy, there would be foreseeable motivations for
them not to participate in the system for their own good, and it
was where the potential risk for the EDOS came from [5].
Figure 1 shows the ordinary operation system for medicines: it
has a structure of radiation diagram with a central piece marked
“Medical institutions.” In this system, medical institutions were
the dominant stakeholders. They have the power to decide not
only which drug to buy from a drug manufacturer but also the
prescription behaviors.
This ordinary operation system for medicines has certain
drawbacks: by letting providers have the autonomy of buying
and selling medicine, economic factors often outweigh other
concerns, such as social responsibility and service quality, with
for-proﬁt pharmaceutical companies having more control of the
drug market [6]. Information asymmetry, where patients often do
not have adequate information relevant to choosing or using
medicine, can increase the burden on patients if the market is left
unregulated [2]. Compared with the radiation diagram we drew in
Figure 1, the EDOS presents a different picture (Fig. 2). In this
system, the Chinese provincial governments are in charge of
purchasing medicines for the medical institutions instead of
letting medical institutions buy medicines themselves. They set
up bidding platforms to modify the behavior of pharmaceutical
manufacturers and implement prescription standards to regulate
the medical institutions’ drug-prescribing practices. By doing so,
pharmaceutical manufacturers must lower their price and
enhance the quality of their products to compete in the bidding
process. Simultaneously, medical institutions are not allowed to
use more expensive and unnecessary drugs when an essential
drug can be used in the situation. These regulations enhance the
governments’ ability to exert control in the drug market and
ensure provision of drugs to ordinary citizens at minimal costs
[7].
Stakeholder analysis has a history of almost 30 years and is
one of the current important methods to help decision makers
get a clear understanding about the operation system as a whole
[8]. Because of the diversity of stakeholders, some of them may
inﬂuence the project far greater than do others. We browsed sixFig. 1 – Operation system for medicines out of the essential
drug list.authoritative articles and screened out 11 major stakeholders for
the EDOS [9–14]. The primary purpose of this study was to
categorize diverse stakeholders in the EDOS by using three key
attributes: power, legitimacy, and urgency. The “power” of stake-
holders is their ability to mobilize and withdraw social and
political forces. The “legitimacy” is constructed by both norma-
tive legitimacy and derivative legitimacy: normatively legitimate
stakeholders are those to whom the organization has a moral
obligation based on fairness; derivatively legitimate stakeholders
are those whose actions might affect normatively legitimate
stakeholders and thus need to be accounted for by managers
[15]. The “urgency” is based on sensitivity and criticality: the
former is the degree to which managerial delay is unacceptable
when dealing with claims; the latter is the importance of the
claim to the stakeholder [16]. According to the deﬁnition by
Mitchell et al. [16], dangerous stakeholders were those who have
power and urgency but no legitimacy. Therefore, this category of
stakeholders tended to chase their own interest (i.e., proﬁt)
without concern for social outcomes and needed to be paid
serious attention. Other categories of stakeholders are presented
in Table 1. For more details related to the characteristics of each
category of stakeholders, we refer readers to Mitchell et al.’s
article [16].
The primary objective of this study was to evaluate the
current role and its performance of each major stakeholder in
the EDOS. Through the stakeholder analysis, we would be able to
get a clear picture of how each stakeholder would react in
response to the implementation of the essential drug policy.
After that, certain stakeholders that are more inﬂuential in the
EDOS would be further discussed. Our ultimate goal was to
evaluate and predict the likelihood of success for this new
essential drug policy through a thorough evaluation of the
compliance of all the major stakeholders involved.Methods
Data Source
Literature articles and expert opinion related to stakeholders for
the essential drug policy were used to identify 11 main stake-
holders. These were central government, provincial govern-
ments, patients, mass media, community residents,
pharmaceutical manufacturers, delivery enterprises, medical
insurance institutions, local governments, medical institutions,
and pharmacies.
Table 1 – Classiﬁcation method for stakeholders.
Categories Power Legitimacy Urgency Alert level
Dormant stakeholder 1 0 0 Middle
Discretionary stakeholder 0 1 0 Middle
Demanding stakeholder 0 0 1 Low
Dominant stakeholder 1 1 0 High
Deﬁnitive stakeholder 1 1 1 High
Dangerous stakeholder 1 0 1 High
Dependent stakeholder 0 1 1 Middle
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Questionnaire survey method and the Delphi method. The Delphi
experts group had 36 experts from Shandong University, Provincial
Hospital, Academy of Medical Science, Bureau of Health, and
Provincial Center of Disease Control (CDC). We set up an authority
self-evaluation test with two indexes: Ca (How conﬁdent you are
about your viewpoint?) and Cs (How familiar you are with the
topic?). Authority index Cr¼ CaþCsð Þ=2. Scholars whose values of
Cr are higher than 0.7 pass the authority examination [17] and are
accepted into the next step. Twenty-six (72.2%) experts passed the
authority examination. Kendall’s concordance coefﬁcient showed
that all scholars had reached an agreement (P o 0.01) after three
rounds of the Questionnaire survey and the proportion of satis-
faction for every index was more than 70%.
Critical Index Calculation
Bourne and Walker [18] develop the vested interest–impact index
(ViII) to illustrate both the probability and the level of stakeholder
impact on project execution. The formula is as follows:
ViII¼
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
v i=25
q
The vested interest levels (v) and the inﬂuence impact levels (i)
were valued numerically as follows: 5 ¼ very high, 4 ¼ high, 3 ¼
neutral, 2 ¼ low, and 1 ¼ very low.
In this research, we used Stefan Olander’s Stakeholder Impact
Index (SII) [19] to evaluate the actual effects of stakeholders on
the whole project. The formula is as follows:
SII¼ViII A P
The stakeholder attribute value (A) was assessed by weighing the
total score of power, legitimacy, and urgency. Under usual
conditions, these three indexes weighed 0.4, 0.3, and 0.3 sepa-
rately. The stakeholder position value (P) was qualitatively
assessed as active opposition (1), passive opposition (0.5),
not committed (0), passive support (0.5), and active support (1).
The higher the value the single stakeholder has, the stronger the
impact is on the whole project. All the critical values used to
calculate ViII and SII were extracted from results of the Delphi
analysis. The value of ViII indicates the potential impact of
stakeholders on the whole project; however, how much of the
potential impact could be fulﬁlled still depends on those stake-
holders’ attribute and position. Thus, SII measures the actual
impact of the stakeholders on the project.Table 2 – Results of the uniformity test for v, i, and P in
Indexes W
Vested interest level (v) 0.429
Inﬂuence impact levels (i) 0.752
Stakeholder position value (P) 0.766
W, Kendall’s concordance coefﬁcient.Model Structure
Lynda and Derek [20] proposed the initial theory for constructing
the stakeholder circle model in 2005 with the purpose of setting up
a clear, efﬁcient, and comprehensive model for decision makers
even without speciﬁc knowledge of the ﬁeld. We designed the
circular model for EDOS on the basis of their theory. In this model,
the concentric line indicated the urgency of stakeholders. Patterns
of stakeholder entities indicated their homogeneity. The stake-
holder who has patterns with different colors indicated hetero-
geneity within its group. The size of the area represented the value
of ViII; however, whether this impact power can be fully used
depends on the attitude consistency of the stakeholders. Color
density indicated the inﬂuence impact level (SII) of stakeholders.Results
Power, legitimacy, and urgency were qualitative indexes with
only two options (exist or not); therefore, scholars reached a
highly consistent agreement on them in the ﬁrst round of the
Delphi survey. It takes three rounds, however, to complete the
discussion on the rest of indexes (v, i, and P). The results of the
uniformity test are presented in Table 2.
Table 2 presents homogeneity within scholars in the Delphi
group. Based on our analysis, Table 3 presents the survey ﬁndings
on the attributes of the stakeholders and their relative impor-
tance (ViII score and SII score) to the EDOS.
Central Government, Provincial Governments, and Local
Governments
“Who should lead the implementation for essential drug policy?”
has been argued among academic circles for a considerable
period, and studies have tried to come to conclusive results
[21]. Our results presented in Table 3 indicate that the central
government may not be the best choice due to a lack of urgency
in handling such important matters at the central level. Time
delays and information barriers are common resistance for the
central government handling immediate problems. On the con-
trary, provincial governments have power, legitimacy, and
urgency, and it would likely be highly efﬁcient letting them lead
the implementation of the essential drug policy. The ViII score for
the central government is higher than that for the provincial
governments (1.00 vs. 0.8), indicating that the central governmentthe Delphi group.
χ2 df Signiﬁcance
90.119 10 0.000
157.991 10 0.000
160.931 10 0.000
Table 3 – Index system of stakeholder analysis for essential drug operation system*.
Stakeholder Attribute Class Indexes related to stakeholder
analysis
Power Legitimacy Urgency A v i P ViII SII
Central government 0.4 0.3 Dominant 0.7 5 5 1 1.00 0.70
Provincial governments 0.4 0.3 0.3 Deﬁnitive 1.0 4 4 1 0.80 0.80
Local governments 0.3 0.3 Dependent 0.6 5 4 1 0.89 0.53
Medical institutions 0.3 0.3 Dependent 0.6 3 2 0 0.49 0.00
Pharmaceutical
manufacturers
0.4 0.3 Dangerous 0.7 4 3 0 0.69 0.00
Delivery enterprises 0.4 0.3 Dangerous 0.7 4 3 0 0.69 0.00
Patients 0.3 Discretionary 0.3 5 1 1 0.45 0.14
Medical insurance institutions 0.3 Discretionary 0.3 4 3 1 0.69 0.21
Mass media 0.4 Dormant 0.7 1 4 1 0.40 0.28
Community 0.3 Discretionary 0.3 4 2 1 0.57 0.17
Drug stores 0.4 Dormant 0.4 4 2 0.5 0.57 0.11
*SIIproj¼
P
SIIk. [19].
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urgency, however, the actual impact of the central government is
lower than that of the provincial governments (SII score 0.7 vs
0.8). The local governments are dependent stakeholders in the
EDOS. Because of limited power, their functions largely rely on
provincial and national drug policies. Thus, even though they
have a large potential impact (ViII score 0.89), their actual impact
on the EDOS is limited (SII score 0.53).
Medical Institutions
As major providers, medical institutions play an essential part in
the general drug market. Recent studies have found that the
essential drug policy has harmed physicians’ interests, especially
those physicians who worked at peripheral-level clinics (e.g.,
village clinic) because of reasons such as delayed reimbursement
[4]. This ﬁnding is in accordance with our results in Table 3. With
limited motivation, the position score dropped to zero (P score ¼
0) for medical institutions, indicating a neutral position in the
EDOS. Also, as a dependent stakeholder, the only way the
medical institutions can achieve their needs is by relying on
the other stakeholders. In China, most medical institutions,
especial major hospitals, are funded and supported by the
government. Therefore, government policy usually has a major
impact on medical institution beneﬁts. Compliance with the
essential drug policy could potentially be against the pursuit of
personal interests in their case. Because prescribing essential
drugs to the patients would reduce provider beneﬁts, it could also
lead to a reduction in provider motivation in complying with it
[22]. As we can see in Table 3, medical institutions have a large
potential impact (ViII ¼ 0.49), but their actual impact on the EDOS
is low (SII ¼ 0), potentially due to a lack of motivation.
Pharmaceutical Manufacturers and Delivery Enterprises
Pharmaceutical manufacturers and delivery enterprises are two
dangerous stakeholders in the system. They became potential
threats not only because they lack legitimacy but also because the
policy reduces their possible beneﬁts [23]. In the present situation,
their beneﬁts with the introduction of the essential drug policy are
uncertain. Large and middle-sized pharmaceutical manufacturers
and delivery enterprises see potential proﬁts and have the motiva-
tion to engage the EDOS by actively participating in the provincial
bidding. There is no certainty, however, whether those stakeholders
will retain such interest or will take countermeasures promoting
failure of the EDOS. Both pharmaceutical manufacturers anddelivery enterprises have potentially large impacts (ViII score ¼
0.69); thus, their effects could be devastating for the policy if they
turned their position against the system.
Drug Stores
Drug stores are the only class of stakeholders that have a
negative position toward the EDOS. Because of the nature of
drugs on the EDL, drug stores would proﬁt less from selling them
compared with selling drugs not on the EDL. The actual negative
impact of drug stores on the whole system, however, is relatively
small (SII ¼ 0.11).
Others
Medical insurance institutions, patients, and community are
three discretionary stakeholders in the EDOS. They all have a
positive impact on the system. Mass media is a dormant stake-
holder and has a positive impact (SII ¼ 0.28) on the implementa-
tion of the essential drug policy.
Table 3 also showed that the EDOS has an overall large
positive SII score (2.72), indicating that the system would run
smoothly in the near future. We constructed the circular model
for essential drug policy (Figure 3) by using data in Table 3. As we
mentioned above, provincial governments are the best choice for
running the essential drug policy. Therefore, we circle the central
government (dark spot in the middle) with provincial govern-
ments in Fig. 3, indicating that the central government is still in
charge of the whole program but providing provincial govern-
ments with more autonomy would accelerate the implementa-
tion of the essential drug policy. After that, three stakeholders
with colorful patterns should raise decision makers’ attention:
these are pharmaceutical manufacturers, delivery enterprises,
and local governments. Both pharmaceutical manufacturers and
delivery enterprises showed a neutral attitude on the whole
because the essential drug policy brought great beneﬁts to large
pharmaceutical manufacturers and delivery enterprises but elim-
inated almost all small and middle-sized stakeholders out of the
game. Therefore, stakeholders in these two categories had differ-
ent attitudes toward the essential drug policy (colorful pattern).
Local governments were a special class in the system. It con-
tained different layers including city, county, village, and district,
which possess different attitude toward the essential drug policy.
Therefore, we marked this class of stakeholders with circles of
different color density. Even though their interests and attitudes
were different, their overall position should be supportive because
Fig. 3 – Circular model for essential drug policy.
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Medical institutions, who had a high level of ViII, should make
great contributions to the project but remain unused (SII ¼ 0).Discussion
On the basis of high impact score (SIIproj ¼ 2.72) as well as the large
proportion of supportive stakeholders (SII4 0), we believe that this
system would operate smoothly in the near future. We predict,
however, that modiﬁcations are still needed to improve the
performance of the system. For one thing, the deﬁnitive stake-
holders play the most important roles in the system. To make the
system run smoothly, it is essential to ensure that those deﬁnitive
stakeholders (provincial governments) have enough power and
resources to achieve their as well as the policy goals. For another,
the dangerous stakeholders have potentially uncertain effects on
the policy results. Letting them function without restriction or
supervision would risk the entire system. The government must
constantly supervise and motivate them to make sure they do not
shift their position and compromise the system objectives. These
two categories of stakeholders are further discussed below.
Deﬁnitive Stakeholders
The general strategy for the Chinese government was to provide
provincial governments with more autonomy and the central
government acts only as a directorate, leading the whole project
by issuing acts and supporting policies [24]. Provincial govern-
ments could potentially beneﬁt from more autonomy in decision
making relevant to policy implementation and modiﬁcation
because this could make the process more efﬁcient owing to
the consideration of the local context. Also, because of the lack of
experience for implementing the essential drug policy in speciﬁccountries such as China, letting provincial governments develop
their own ways of implementation could effectively help the
Chinese government explore an appropriate method for running
the EDOS in China. Giving more autonomy, however, does not
mean a total control of all issues. In the last 2 years after the
beginning of the implementation of the policy, provinces all
across China have shown different capacities for achieving the
policy goal [25]. Some of them constructed an outstanding EDOS
with a rational and fair drug-bidding platform. On the contrary,
some of the others destroyed the EDOS by letting inferior
medicines win the bidding and dominate the drug market [22].
Under these circumstances, the central government should con-
struct a platform for provinces to exchange experience. The plat-
form could be created in the form of an annual symposium,
seasonal meeting, learning class, video conferences, or any other
forms, but should have a singular theme: developing versatile
methods for running the EDOS. Decision makers should not
appreciate letting stakeholders on the grassroots level have too
much autonomy. Although having autonomy could efﬁciently raise
the reactivity for the EDOS, it would also provide them with more
access to make personal proﬁts, and this would sharply raise the
possibility of an unexpected cost increase for both government and
patients. A later, ultimate structure of this EDOS might be a
consolidating of power back to the central government by issuing
a rational guideline for running the EDOS for all provinces to abide
by [26]. If decision makers could realize that this would happen in
the next phase of implementation of the essential drug policy, they
would be willing to start constructing versatile methods through
exchanging experience among provinces in the current phase.
Dangerous Stakeholders
Pharmaceutical manufacturers and delivery enterprises are the
two classes of dangerous stakeholders in the EDOS. Because of
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possibility that they pursue their own goals through violent
behavior [27]. In the last 2 years, different provinces encountered
various problems caused by dangerous stakeholders. The worst
incident happened in the Anhui province where smaller phar-
maceutical manufacturers trumped large pharmaceutical manu-
facturers in the bidding and poured inferior medicines into the
market, completely staining essential drugs’ reputation [28]. It
prompted a deep thought about “how do we make stakeholders
willing to compete within the range of policy and laws rather
than ﬁnding illegal ways to achieve their own proﬁts?” In our
previous study [29] we indicated that self-motivation is the key
solution for the question above. In the circular model for EDOS,
both pharmaceutical manufacturers and delivery enterprises
have a large impact on the EDOS (Vill ¼ 0.69). The only reason
they contributed nothing to the project (SII ¼ 0) was because
stakeholders in each category had different attitudes (patterned
color). If their attitudes turned uniformly supportive (P 4 0),
dangerous stakeholders could make a great contribution to the
project. To motivate pharmaceutical manufacturers, a fair, bal-
anced, and self-stabilized bidding system should be constructed.
The Chinese government tried to improve the rationality of the
bidding process by focusing on both quality and price of drugs
through a screening method called “Double Envelopes” [30],
which required that pharmaceutical manufacturers pass the
technique evaluation before they participate in price competition.
This method, however, has certain ﬂaws: Who should be in
charge of evaluating the technique score of drugs and how to
evaluate? The Chinese government currently evaluates the tech-
nique score of each bidder through expert evaluation and mainly
on the basis of prescription preference and producers’ production
capacity. This method is subjective and improperly eliminates
two essential categorizes of bidders: nonlocal pharmaceutical
manufacturers (less favored by local physicians) and excellent
middle-sized pharmaceutical manufacturers (low production
capacity) who had been in the essential drugs market for years.
The Chinese government, especially provincial governments,
should be dedicated to exploring more objective indicators for
evaluating the technique score. This goal could be achieved
through speciﬁc evidence-based medical experiments; however,
this bidding platform should have continuous attraction for
bidders to participate in (self-stabilization) [31]. The Chinese
government was happy to see the byproduct of implementing
the essential drug policy–industry integration both in pharma-
ceutical manufacturers and in delivery enterprises. This integra-
tion had great social beneﬁts even for the ordinary drug market
[32]. There remain potential, however, concerns that the Chinese
government should take into consideration: today’s bidding plat-
form was not a self-stabilized one. We could ﬁnd that pharma-
ceutical manufacturers who win the bidding are getting more
likely to win again. Because of scale expansion and technology
promotion after winning, they could gain advantages on costs,
prices, and qualities, and therefore raise their possibilities for
becoming the next winner. As we all know, additional cost was
required for changing industries into producing essential drugs. If
pharmaceutical manufacturers are unlikely to win the bid, they
might lose the participation enthusiasm. Therefore, a decline in
the number of bidders can be foreseen. On the contrary, a fair
bidding platform requires perfect competition. More participants
in a single bidding could reduce the drug prices as well as
motivate the bidders to improve their technology. This paradox
explains why the current platform is not a self-stabilized plat-
form. The Chinese government should design a rational protec-
tion policy for pharmaceutical manufacturers who are willing to
participate in the bidding even if they are less likely to win. And
stakeholders who are willing to explore innovations in manu-
facturing technique, pharmaceutical formulation, and even newcategories of essential drugs should be encouraged, protected,
and rewarded [33]. The Chinese government had shortened the
period for the admission of new drugs recently, which was a good
start. For delivery enterprises, avoiding single delivery enter-
prises dominating the whole provincial delivery industry is a
primary requirement [34].
To sum up, the circular model for essential drug policy is a
highly efﬁcient model for decision makers. Stakeholders close to
the project’s center were provincial governments, followed by
pharmaceutical manufacturers, delivery enterprises, and local
governments. An experience exchange platform is required for
the Chinese government to coordinate implementation progress
among provinces. And this platform can also contribute to
exploring a uniform method for running the EDOS. After that,
the government should put more focus on constructing a fare,
balanced, and self-stabilized bidding system. Exploring more
objective indicators while protecting innovations in manufactur-
ing technique, pharmaceutical formulation, and even new cate-
gories of essential drugs would contribute to the whole project.
Besides the above stakeholders, there were some other stake-
holders that the Chinese government should take care of, such as
medical institutions.Limitations
It is widely acknowledged that the Delphi expert panel method
often suffers from selection bias and by selective inclusion of
experts from certain ﬁelds [35]. In our study, we included experts
only from colleges, medical providers, and governmental depart-
ments, which might not represent the perspective of all stake-
holder entities. It is possible that this expert selection process has
biased our results. Considering the scope and complexity of the
EDOS, however, it is unlikely that people from other ﬁelds such as
mass media, drug stores, and patients would pass the authority
test at the beginning of the study. Therefore, we had to com-
promise under the given situation with a narrowed source of
experts to conduct our study.Acknowledgments
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